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1.  Indeterministic Causality  

I will begin by distinguishing between deterministic and indeterministic causality.  A causal claim of the form A causes B is deterministic, only if, ceteris paribus, whenever A occurs, it is followed by B.  Otherwise, the claim is indeterministic.
Deterministic causality is the traditional concept of causality which is analysed by 18th and 19th century philosophers such as Hume and Kant.  Indeed Kant says in The Critique of Pure Reason (1787, B5):

“ … the very concept of a cause … manifestly contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect and of the strict universality of the rule …”

So, according to Kant, if A causes B, and A occurs, then B is sure to follow.  This is what we have called deterministic causality.    
In the 20th century, however, a new concept of causality emerged largely in connection with medical epidemiology.  If a casual claim of the form A causes B is indeterministic, then A can occur without always being followed by B.  One of the first examples of indeterministic causality was the claim that 

Smoking causes lung cancer						(1)

This is now generally accepted, but in fact only about 5% of smokers get lung cancer.  So, although smoking causes lung cancer, smoking is not always followed by lung cancer.  However, P(lung cancer | smoker) is about 10 times greater than P(lung cancer | not-smoker).  This suggests that if A causes B in the indeterministic sense, then the occurrence of A raises the probability of B.  

	If A causes B, then P(B | A) > P(B | not-A)				(2)

This probability raising principle is quite plausible, but unfortunately it turns out that it is not always true, as I will show, in the next section by giving a well-known counterexample to it introduced by Hesslow in 1976.
This is one problem with indeterministic causality, and Galavotti, who refers to indeterministic causality as probabilistic causality, points out that there are quite a number of others.  She writes (2010, p. 140):

“The first problem that arises as soon as causality is taken as a probable rather than constant conjunction is that of identifying causal as opposed to spurious relations, without getting muddled with problems of the Simpson’s paradox kind.  A further problem is that of defining the asymmetry of the causal nexus, … .  Moreover, the virtuous circle linking causality, explanation and prediction within classical determinism (of the Laplacean kind) breaks down in the case of probabilistic causality.”

Galavotti is quite correct here, and in this paper I will argue for one of the points she makes, namely that indeterministic causality leads to Simpson’s paradox.  This is most easily done by considering the Hesslow counter-example. 


2.  The Hesslow Counterexample

For this counter-example (Hesslow, 1976), we consider a population of young women, all living with male partners, where the only contraceptive method available is the contraceptive pill.  Suppose further that both pregnancy and taking the contraceptive pill cause thrombosis, but that the probability of getting thrombosis is higher for those who are pregnant than for those who take the pill.  So stopping taking the pill in this population makes pregnancy very likely, and that in turn gives a higher probability of thrombosis.  It therefore follows that stopping taking the pill increases the probability of thrombosis, or in symbols

P(thrombosis | pill) < P(thrombosis | not-pill)			(3)

This is the exact opposite of the smoking case, where smoking causes lung cancer, and

	P(lung cancer | smoker) > P(lung cancer | not-smoker)		(4)

The case of pill and thrombosis is therefore a counter-example to the plausible probability raising principle (2).  The pill causes thrombosis, and yet the probability of getting thrombosis for those taking the pill is less than for those who do not take the pill. 
One way of trying to overcome the difficulty is the following.  We should admit that the probability raising principle (2) does not hold for all reference classes, but we can still try to specify some reference classes for which it does hold.  In Hesslow’s example, the reference class (S sayt consists of a set of young women living with male partners in a situation in which taking the pill is the only contraceptive method available.  As we have seen, the probability raising principle does not hold for this reference class. 






3.  Simpson’s Paradox

I will now show how the problem generated by the Hesslow counter-example is, as Galavotti observes in her 2010, an instance of Simpson’s paradox.  To see this, let us consider the most famous example of Simpson’s paradox, which concerned the seeming occurrence of gender discrimination in admission to Berkeley’s graduate school.  Let us take as our initial reference class S, the set of applicants to this graduate school.   These applicants were either male or female, and their application was either successful or unsuccessful.  Statistics showed that, in the reference class S, P(success | male) > P(success | female).  It therefore looked as if gender-discrimination in favour of males was at work.  However, in practice, applicants applied to particular departments and each department conducted its own admission procedure.  So, if there were gender-discrimination, it would have to be at the departmental level.  Now suppose the departments were D1, D2, … , Dn.  Then we can partition our reference class S into n sub-reference classes S & Di where 1  i  n.  Statistics showed that, for each of these sub- reference classes, P(success | male) < P(success | female).  So gender-discrimination in favour of males could not in fact be occurring.
At first sight these results seem impossible – hence the name ‘Simpson’s paradox’.  If in every member of a partition of a reference class, a probabilistic inequality holds, how could it reverse in the reference class as a whole?  It is indeed surprising that this occurs, but it is in fact quite possible.  The explanation in the case of the Berkeley admissions was that a greater percentage of females than males were applying to departments, which had high rejection rates.
Of course, the explanation of Simpson’s paradox in the Hesslow case is different.  It is connected with the action of several causal factors which themselves interact causally.  However, this does lead to an instance of Simpson’s paradox, since in each of the disjoint reference classes S&(Y=0) and S&(Y=1), we have

	P(thrombosis | pill) > P(thrombosis | not-pill)

whereas in the  reference class S, we have
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